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The Look of Silence is Joshua Oppenheimer’s powerful companion piece to the Oscar®-
nominated The Act of Killing. Through Oppenheimer’s footage of perpetrators of the 1965 
Indonesian genocide, a family of survivors discovers how their son was murdered, as well as 
the identities of the killers. The documentary focuses on the youngest son, an optometrist 
named Adi, who decides to break the suffocating spell of submission and terror by doing 
something unimaginable in a society where the murderers remain in power: he confronts the 
men who killed his brother and, while testing their eyesight, asks them to accept responsibility 







The Act of Killing exposed the consequences for all of us when we build our everyday reality on 
terror and lies. The Look of Silence explores what it is like to be a survivor in such a 
reality. There is a scene in The Look of Silence, filmed in January 2004, which is the genesis of 
both films: two former death squad leaders lead me along a road and down to the banks of 
North Sumatra’s Snake River, re-enacting with apparent glee how they helped the army kill 
10,500 people at a single clearing on the riverbank. At the end, they pose for snapshots—
souvenirs of what for them was a happy and memorable afternoon out. Experiencing one of the 
most traumatic days of my life, I knew I would make two companion films. 
 
What chilled me was not the facts of the genocide, nor even the boasting—an obvious 
manifestation of the killers’ impunity and on-going power. Rather, what terrified me was the fact 
that the two men had never met before, yet seemed to be reading from a shared script. They 
both felt that boasting was the acceptable way of speaking about these events. I realised that 
the boasting was systemic. 
 
So I decided that neither film would be a historical documentary about the events of 1965        
per se. Instead, both would explore the present-day legacy of the genocide. One film—what 
became The Act of Killing—would explore the stories victorious perpetrators tell themselves so 
that they can live with themselves, and the consequences of these lies on their own humanity 
and on society. The other film would tackle an equally important question: what happens to a 
whole society and its people when they live in fear and silence for fifty years. That film would 
be The Look of Silence. 
 
Making any film about survivors of genocide is to walk into a minefield of clichés, most of which 
serve to create a heroic (if not saintly) protagonist with whom we can identify, thereby offering 
the false reassurance that, in the moral catastrophe of atrocity, we are nothing like the 
  
perpetrators. But presenting survivors as saintly in order to reassure ourselves that we are 
“good” is to use survivors to deceive ourselves. It is an insult to the experience of the survivors, 
and does nothing to help us understand what it means to survive atrocity, what it means to live a 
life shattered by mass violence, and to be silenced by terror. To navigate this minefield of 
clichés, we have had to explore silence itself. 
 
The result, The Look of Silence, is, I hope, a poem about a silence borne of terror—a poem not 
only about the necessity of breaking that silence, but also about the trauma that comes when 
silence is broken. Maybe the film is a monument to silence—a reminder that although we want 
to move on, look away and think of other things, nothing will make whole what has been broken. 
Nothing will wake the dead. We must stop, acknowledge the lives destroyed, and strain to listen 
to the silence that follows. 
 
THE LOOK OF SILENCE  
Story of the Production 
I first went to Indonesia in 2001 to help oil palm plantation workers make a film documenting 
and dramatizing their struggle to organise a union in the aftermath of the US-supported Suharto 
dictatorship, under which unions were illegal. In the remote plantation villages of North Sumatra, 
one could hardly perceive that military rule had officially ended three years earlier. 
The conditions I encountered were deplorable. Women working on the plantation were forced to 
spray herbicide without protective clothing. The mist would enter their lungs and then their 
bloodstreams, destroying their liver tissue. The women would fall ill, and many would die in their 
forties. When they protested their conditions, the Belgian-owned company would hire 
paramilitary thugs to threaten them, and sometimes physically attack them. 
Fear was the biggest obstacle they faced in organising a union. The Belgian company could get 
away with poisoning its employees because the workers were afraid. I quickly learned the 
source of this fear: the plantation workers had a large and active union until 1965, when their 
parents and grandparents were accused of being “communist sympathizers” (simply for being in 
the union) and put into concentration camps, where they were exploited as slave labor and 
ultimately murdered by the army and civilian death squads. 
In 2001, the killers not only enjoyed complete impunity, but they and their protégés still 
dominated all levels of government, from the plantation village to the parliament. Survivors lived 
in fear that the massacres could happen again at any time. 
After we completed the film (The Globalisation Tapes, 2002), the survivors asked us to return as 
quickly as possible to make another film about the source of their fear—that is, a film about what 
it's like for survivors to live surrounded by the men who murdered their loved ones, men still in 
positions of power. 
  
We returned almost immediately, in early 2003, and began investigating one 1965 murder that 
the plantation workers spoke of frequently. The victim’s name was Ramli, and his name was 
used almost as a synonym for the killings in general. 
I came to understand the reason this particular murder was so often discussed: there were 
witnesses. It was undeniable. Unlike the hundreds of thousands of victims who disappeared at 
night from concentration camps, Ramli’s death was public. There were witnesses to his final 
moments, and the killers left his body in the oil palm plantation, less than two miles from his 
parents’ home. Years later, the family was able to surreptitiously erect a gravestone, though 
they could only visit the grave in secret. 
Survivors and ordinary Indonesians alike would talk about “Ramli,” I think, because his fate was 
grim evidence of what had happened to all the others, and to the nation as a whole. Ramli was 
proof that the killings, no matter how taboo, had, in fact, occurred. His death verified for the 
villagers the horrors that the military regime threatened them into pretending had never 
occurred, yet threatened to unleash again. To speak of “Ramli” and his murder was to pinch 
oneself to make sure one is awake, a reminder of the truth, a commemoration of the past, a 
warning for the future. For survivors and the public on the plantation, remembering “Ramli” was 
to acknowledge the source of their fear—and thus a necessary first step to overcoming it. 
And so, when I returned in early 2003, it was inevitable that Ramli’s case would come up often. 
The plantation workers quickly sought out his family, introducing me to Ramli’s dignified mother, 
Rohani, his ancient but playful father, Rukun, and his siblings—including the youngest, Adi, an 
optician, born after the killings. 
Rohani thought of Adi as a replacement for Ramli. She had Adi so she could continue to live, 
and Adi has lived with that burden his whole life. Like children of survivors all across Indonesia, 
Adi grew up in a family officially designated “politically unclean,” impoverished by decades of 
extortion by local military officials, and traumatized by the genocide. 
Because Adi was born after the killings, he was not afraid to speak out, to demand answers. I 
believe he gravitated to my filmmaking as a way of understanding what his family had been 
through, a way of expressing and overcoming a terror everybody around him had been too 
afraid to acknowledge. 
I befriended Adi at once and together we began gathering other survivors’ families in the region. 
They would come together and tell stories, and we would film. For many, it was the first time 
they had publicly spoken about what happened. On one occasion, a survivor arrived at Ramli’s 
parents’ home, trembling with fear, terrified that if the police discovered what we were doing, 
she would be arrested and forced into slave labor. Yet she came because she was determined 
to testify. Each time a motorcycle or car would pass, we would stop filming, hiding what 
equipment we could. Subject to decades of economic apartheid, survivors rarely could afford 
more than a bicycle, so the sound of a motor meant an outsider was passing. 
  
The Army, which is stationed in every village in Indonesia, quickly found out what we were doing 
and threatened the survivors, including Adi’s siblings, not to participate in the film. The survivors 
urged me, “Before you give up and go home, try to film the perpetrators. They may tell you how 
they killed our relatives.” I did not know if it was safe to approach the killers, but when I did I 
found all of them to be boastful, immediately recounting the grisly details of the killings, often 
with smiles on their faces, in front of their families, even their small grandchildren. The contrast 
between survivors being forced into silence and perpetrators boastfully recounting stories far 
more incriminating than anything the survivors could have told made me feel as though I'd 
wandered into Germany 40 years after the Holocaust, only to find the Nazis still in power. 
When I showed these testimonials to those survivors who wanted to see it, including Adi and 
Ramli’s other siblings, everybody said, more or less: “You are on to something terribly 
important. Keep filming the perpetrators, because anybody who sees this will be forced to 
acknowledge the rotten heart of the regime the killers have built.” From that point on, I felt 
entrusted by the survivors and human rights community to accomplish work that they could not 
safely do themselves: film the perpetrators. All of them would enthusiastically invite me to the 
places they killed, and launch into spontaneous demonstrations of how they killed. They would 
complain afterwards that they had not thought to bring along a machete to use as a prop, or a 
friend to play a victim. One day, early in this process, I met the leader of the death squad on the 
plantation where we had filmed The Globalisation Tapes. He and a fellow executioner invited 
me to a clearing on the banks of Snake River, a spot where he had helped murder 10,500 
people. Suddenly, I realised he was telling me how he had killed Ramli. I had stumbled across 
one of Ramli’s killers. 
I told Adi about this encounter, and he and other family members asked to see the footage. That 
was how they learned the details of Ramli’s death. 
For the next two years, from 2003–2005, I filmed every perpetrator I could find across North 
Sumatra, working from death squad to death squad up the chain of command, from the 
countryside to the city. Anwar Congo, the man who would become the main character in The 
Act of Killing, was the 41st perpetrator I filmed. 
I spent the next five years shooting The Act of Killing, and throughout the process Adi would ask 
to see the material we were filming. He would watch as much as I could find time to show him. 
He was transfixed. 
Perpetrators on film normally deny their atrocities (or apologize for them), because by the time 
filmmakers reach them they have been removed from power, their actions condemned and 
expiated. Here I was filming perpetrators of genocide who won, who built a regime of terror 
founded on the celebration of genocide, and who remain in power. They have not been forced 
to admit what they did was wrong. It is in this sense that The Act of Killing is not a documentary 
about a genocide 50 years ago. It is an exposé of a present-day regime of fear. The film is not a 
historical narrative. It is a film about history itself, about the lies victors tell to justify their 
  
actions, and the effects of those lies; it is a film about an unresolved traumatic past that 
continues to haunt the present. 
I knew from the start of my journey that there was another, equally urgent film to make, also 
about the present. The Act of Killing is haunted by the absent victims—the dead. Almost every 
painful passage culminates abruptly in a haunted and silent tableau, an empty, often ruined 
landscape, inhabited by a single lost, lonely figure. Time stops. There is a rupture in the film’s 
point of view, an abrupt shift to silence, a commemoration of the dead, and the lives pointlessly 
destroyed. I knew that I would make another film, one where we step into those haunted spaces 
and feel viscerally what it is like for the survivors forced to live there, forced to build lives under 
the watchful eyes of the men who murdered their loved ones, and remain powerful. That film 
is The Look of Silence.  
Apart from the older footage from 2003–2005 that Adi watches, we shot The Look of 
Silence in 2012, after editing The Act of Killing but before releasing it—after which I knew I could 
no longer safely return to Indonesia. We worked closely with Adi and his parents, who had 
become, along with my anonymous Indonesian crew, like an extended family to me. 
 
Adi spent years studying footage of perpetrators. He would react with shock, sadness 
and outrage. He wanted to make sense of that experience. Meanwhile, his children were in 
school, being taught that what had happened to them—enslavement, torture, murder, decades 
of political apartheid—all of this was their fault, instilling them and other survivors’ children 
with shame. Adi was deeply affected—and angered—by the boasting of the perpetrators, 
his parents’ trauma and fear and the brainwashing of his children. 
 
In early 2010, as I finished filming The Act of Killing, I gave Adi a video camera to use as a 
notebook to search for metaphors that might inspire the making of The Look of Silence. When I 
returned to Indonesia to make the film in 2012, I asked Adi how we should begin. He told me 
that he had spent seven years watching my footage of the perpetrators, and it had changed him. 
He wanted to meet the men who murdered his brother. 
 
I refused immediately. It would be too dangerous, I told him. For a victim to confront a 
perpetrator in Indonesia is all but unimaginable. There has never been a nonfiction film, in the 
history of cinema, where survivors confront perpetrators who still hold a monopoly on power. In 
response, Adi took out the camera I had given him, and one cassette. “I never sent you this 
tape,” he explained, “because it is meaningful to me.” Trembling, he put the tape in the camera, 
pressed play, and began to cry. On the camera’s flip screen came the one scene in The Look of 
Silence that Adi shot: the scene at the end in which his father, Rukun, lost in his own home, is 
calling for help as he crawls from room to room. Through his tears, Adi explained: “This was the 
first day my father could not remember me, my siblings, or my mom. All day, he was lost, calling 
for help, but when we tried to help we only made him more frightened, because we had become 
strangers to him. It was unbearable not to do anything, and after hours of this, not knowing what 
else to do, I picked up the camera and filmed, asking myself why I am filming? But then I 
understood: this is the day it became too late for my father to heal. He has forgotten the son 
  
whose murder ruined his family’s life, but he has not forgotten the fear. Now that he cannot 
remember what happened, he will never work through, grieve, mourn. He will die with this fear, 
like a man locked in a room who cannot even find the door, let alone the key.”  
 
We watched the footage in silence. When it was finished, Adi said, “I do not want my children to 
inherit this prison of fear from my father, my mother, and from me.” He told me that if he were to 
visit the men without anger, showing that he is willing to forgive if they can take responsibility for 
what they have done, they would greet his visit as a long-awaited opportunity to stop their manic 
boasting and accept their guilt, to find forgiveness from one of their victim’s families. In this way, 
Adi hoped to live with them as human beings, as neighbors, rather than perpetrators and 
victims, always afraid of each other.  
 
Discussing this with my Indonesian crew, we realised that the shooting of The Act of Killing was 
famous across North Sumatra, but nobody had seen it yet. I was therefore well known across 
the region for having worked closely with the most powerful perpetrators in the country - the 
Vice President, cabinet ministers, the national head of the paramilitary organisation. The men 
Adi hoped to confront were regionally but not nationally powerful. They would think I am close to 
their superiors, and would not want to offend them by physically attacking us or even detaining 
us. Thus, the unique situation of having shot a film like The Act of Killing - but not releasing it yet 
- might allow us to do something unprecedented. 
 
I also realised we were unlikely to get the apology for which Adi was hoping, and I told him so. 
But I felt that if I could show why the perpetrators cannot apologize, if I could film with precision 
and intimacy their complex, human reactions to being visited by their victim’s brother, then 
perhaps I could make visible the abyss of fear, guilt, and (for the perpetrators) fear of their own 
guilt that divides every Indonesian from each other, and from their own past - and thus from 
themselves. I told Adi that by documenting the perpetrators’ inability to apologize, maybe we 
could show how torn the social fabric of Indonesia is. Anybody seeing the film, I hoped, 
would have to support truth, reconciliation, and some form of justice. In this way, I hoped that, 
through the film as a whole, we might succeed in a bigger way where we fail in the individual 
confrontations. 
 
Finally, I realised that whatever truth and reconciliation might come in the future - perhaps, in 
part, as a consequence of our two films - Adi is right: it is too late for Adi’s father. This film 
should honour that, and thus must be more than a ‘political’ film about impunity, and the 
coexistence of powerful perpetrators and terrorised survivors. It should be a poem about 
memory and oblivion, composed in memoriam for all that has been destroyed: not only the dead 
who can never be wakened, but the lives broken by 50 years of fear and silence that can never 
be made whole again.  
 
And so we set out to do something unprecedented: make a film where victims 
confront perpetrators while the perpetrators still hold power. The confrontations were 
dangerous. When we’d meet more powerful perpetrators, we would bring only Adi and my 
Danish crew, cinematographer Lars Skree and producer Signe Byrge Sørensen. Adi would 
  
come with no ID card. We would empty all numbers from our telephones and bring a second car 
we could switch to minutes after leaving, making it harder for the perpetrators to send police or 
thugs to follow us. But none of the confrontations ended violently, largely due to Adi’s patience 
and empathy, and the fact that the perpetrators were not quite sure how to react to us. 
 
Still, the confrontations were tense. Again and again, Adi says the unsayable, leaving 
the audience to feel what it is like to live as a survivor, and to perceive the contours of 
an oppressive silence born of fear.  
 
 
THE RELEASE OF THE LOOK OF SILENCE IN INDONESIA 
 
The first Indonesian screenings of The Act of Killing were held in secret, although ultimately 
there were thousands of public screenings across Indonesia, and we ultimately made the 
Indonesian-language copy of the film available for free on the Internet. 
 
By contrast, the Indonesian premiere of The Look of Silence took place on November 10, 2014, 
and was hosted by Indonesia’s National Commission on Human Rights and the Jakarta Arts 
Council––both agencies of the government––and the screenings were held in Indonesia’s 
largest theatre. There were banners advertising the screening in the streets of Jakarta, and 
more than 2,000 people turned up, a number twice venue’s capacity. The organisers added a 
second packed screening. Unannounced, Adi Rukun arrived to answer audience questions, and 
when he appeared on stage, the audience rose for a 10-minute ovation. 
 
The Act of Killing helped open the space into which The Look of Silence is now doing its work. If 
The Act of Killing forced the Indonesian media and public to speak about the genocide as a 
genocide, The Look of Silence enters that space and shows how torn the social fabric is and 
how desperately Indonesia needs truth, reconciliation, justice and healing. 
 
On December 10, 2014, International Human Rights Day, the film opened across Indonesia. 
Tens of thousands of Indonesians came out for hundreds of public screenings across the 
country. Screening organisers put up billboards advertising the screenings on the streets of 
Indonesian cities from one end of the country to the other. Large public screenings in Medan 
went peacefully, with a powerful and reflective atmosphere. Wherever Adi attended screenings, 
he received standing ovations for his courage. Numerous tweets exclaimed that Indonesia has a 
new ‘national hero.’ On the whole, younger Indonesians are reacting with outrage that they’ve 
been lied to, and recognize in Adi’s dignified example what truth and reconciliation might look 
like. 
 
Over the next three weeks, the film screened 950 times in 116 cities in 32 out of 34 provinces 
across Indonesia. Numerous public screenings were held in Medan, the city where we made 
both The Act of Killing and The Look of Silence. Screenings were organised by cinemas, 
universities, film clubs, NGOs, religious organisations and community groups. Not every 
organisation screening the film informed us how many people were present, but s3,000 people 
  
attended screenings that did inform us of their audience numbers. Repeat screenings are held 
daily, and as of June 2015, new bookings are coming in at a rate of 20 a week. 
 
The press coverage has been phenomenal. There have been more than 731 articles and 
television reports and counting since the film’s Venice premiere. A Jakarta Globe readers’ poll 
for Indonesia’s ‘Person of the Year’ placed the crew of The Look of Silence at number 3, after 
the new President and the Governor of Jakarta (perhaps the leading figure in Indonesia’s 
movement for democratic reform). 
 
The Look of Silence inevitably became a major topic of national conversation throughout mid-to-
late December 2014, with numerous Indonesian media declaring the film to be the best film of 
the year. (This did not happen with The Act of Killing). Tempo Magazine, which published a 
special double edition on The Act of Killing, published a 15-page section on the film’s debut at 
Venice, Telluride and Toronto. And on December 10, 2014, Senator Tom Udall (D-NM), who 
screened The Act of Killing just before the 2014 Academy Awards, introduced a Senate 
Resolution demanding that the US declassify all documents pertaining to America’s role in the 
genocide, and that it apologize for America's part in the slaughter. 
 
As of June 1, 2015, there have been over 3,500 screenings of The Look of Silence, and we 
estimate that more than 300,000 Indonesians have attended screenings. As was the case when 
The Act of Killing was released online, we expect these numbers to reach into the millions.  
 
The massive impact of The Look of Silence inevitably provoked a backlash in a way that The 
Act of Killing did not. Within a few days of the release on December 10, the police and army 
began to organise groups of thugs who threatened to attack screenings. Police or military would 
often approach screening organisers, warning them of an impending attack and demanding that 
the organisers cancel the screening ‘to prevent violence’ (violence that the authorities were 
most likely instigating themselves). 31 screenings were cancelled in this way, from major cities 
to remote villages. 
 
There have been eloquent and brave expressions of outrage in response to this form of 
censorship and demands that the police should protect freedom of expression from thugs, 
rather than bow to the demands of thugs. A number of articles and speeches condemning the 
police response have pointed out that the thugs are themselves organised by the police. 
Impassioned responses came from the rector of one of Indonesia’s most prestigious 
universities, from Indonesia’s National Commission on Human Rights, from the Alliance of 
Independent Journalists, and from editorials in much of Indonesia’s quality media. The Interior 
Minister declared his support in response to the thugs disrupting screenings. 
 
Police in a city in East Java asked the censors for an official determination as to whether the 
film could be screened—this was after the military and thugs cancelled several screenings in 
Malang. In their reply, the censors banned the film entirely from public cinema screening, 
though exempted community screenings. Their arguments could easily have been written during 
the Suharto regime. They argued, incorrectly, that the film creates sympathy for communist 
  
ideology, and that it lacks objectivity because the main character is the child of communist party 
members. In fact, as the film makes clear, no one in Adi’s family was a member of the 
communist party, and such false statements are part of a long tradition of stigmatizing the 
survivors. 
 
The media responded with outrage. Indonesia’s leading newspaper condemned the decision 
with the headline "The Film Censors Betray the Spirit of Democratic Reform” ("LSF 
Mengkhianati Semangat Reformasi”). The National Human Rights Commission has published a 
letter asserting that the decision is invalid and illegal, and expressing their continued support for 
screenings. They are also appealing the decision. 
 
In Spring 2015, an army commander in Central Java made his soldiers watch The Look of 
Silence. On the regional military command’s Facebook page, the commander posted 
photographs showing hundreds of soldiers sitting cross-legged on the floor in straight lines. The 
screening was greeted as a harbinger of change by the Indonesian media, though we do not 
know why the commander chose to show the film to his soldiers. We can imagine, however, that 
they would be as touched as any other Indonesian viewer. 
 
Shortly after that, students at the Universitas Islam Negara in Yogyakarta barricaded 
themselves into campus and went ahead with a large screening that had been threatened by 
thugs hired by the military. The screening passed without incident, and the Indonesian media 
reported widely and on how the students defended their human right to assembly and free 
expression, and in dozens of editorials urged the military to protect basic democratic freedoms 
rather than deploying a shadow state of gangsters and thugs. This positive media reaction 
seemed to end the army’s nation-wide strategy of trying to cancel screenings. To our 
knowledge, no screenings have been canceled since then. 
 
In January, we managed to get a copy of the film to Indonesian President Joko Widodo. His 
government recently introduced a truth and reconciliation bill into parliament. The bill is 
inadequate—it provides no legal mechanism for bringing genocide commanders to justice, and 
the Attorney General argues that the truth commission should not even publish the names of the 
commanders. Human rights activists and media that have come to support truth and 
reconciliation since the premiere of The Act of Killing are urging that the truth and reconciliation 
process should be more credible and robust.  
 
  
IMPACT OF THE ACT OF KILLING 
  
The Act of Killing had the impact the survivors hoped for when they first encouraged me to film 
the perpetrators. It has been screened thousands of times in Indonesia and is available for free 
online to anyone in the country. This has helped catalyze a transformation in how Indonesia 
understands its past. The media and public alike are now able, for the first time without fear, to 
investigate the genocide as a genocide and to debate the links between the moral catastrophe 
  
of the killings and the moral catastrophe of the present-day regime built, and still presided over, 
by the killers. 
  
In October 2012, Indonesia's most important news publication, Tempo Magazine, published a 
special double edition dedicated to The Act of Killing, including 75 pages of boastful 
perpetrators' testimony from across Indonesia. The magazine's editors gathered this testimony 
to show that the film could have been made anywhere in Indonesia, that there are thousands of 
feared perpetrators enjoying impunity around the country, and that the problems of corruption 
and gangsterism are systemic. This special edition broke a 47-year silence about the genocide 
in the mainstream media. 
  
Indonesia's National Commission on Human Rights issued this statement about the film: “If we 
are to transform Indonesia into the democracy it claims to be, citizens must recognize the terror 
and repression on which our contemporary history has been built. No film, or any other work of 
art for that matter, has done this more effectively than The Act of Killing. [It] is essential viewing 
for us all.” 
  
For a long time, the Indonesian government ignored The Act of Killing, hoping it would go away. 
When the film was nominated for an Academy® award, the Indonesian president's spokesman 
acknowledged that the 1965 genocide was a crime against humanity, and that Indonesia needs 
reconciliation—but in its own time. While this was not an embrace of the film, it was incredible 
because it represents an about-face for the government: until then, it had maintained that the 
killings were heroic and glorious. 
  
There is a scene in The Act of Killing in which I accuse one of the perpetrators of committing 
war crimes, and he responds by accusing the West of hypocrisy, noting that the US slaughtered 
the Native Americans. More to the point, the US and the UK helped engineer the Indonesian 
genocide and for decades enthusiastically supported the military dictatorship that came to 
power through the slaughter. 
  
When The Act of Killing was awarded a BAFTA, I used my acceptance speech to note that 
neither the UK nor the US can have an ethical relationship with Indonesia (or so many other 
countries across the global south) until we acknowledge the crimes of the past, and our 
collective role in supporting, participating in and—ultimately—ignoring those crimes. 
  
A film cannot change a country’s political landscape. Like the child in The Emperor’s New 
Clothes, it can only create a space for the people who see it to discuss a nation’s most painful 
and important problems without fear, and for the first time.  
  





THE 1965–1966 MASSACRES IN INDONESIA 
Historical Context 
  
Edited from observations on the massacres, their aftermath and implications, by Historian John 
Roosa (Professor of History, University of British Columbia; Author of "Pretext for Mass Murder: 
The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup D'Etat in Indonesia"). Additional opening 
and closing notes by Joshua Oppenheimer. 
  
In 1965, the Indonesian government was overthrown by the military. Sukarno, Indonesia’s first 
president, founder of the non-aligned movement, and leader of the national revolution against 
Dutch colonialism, was deposed and replaced by right-wing General Suharto. The Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI), which had been a core constituency in the struggle against Dutch 
colonialism, and which had firmly supported President Sukarno (who was not a communist), 
was immediately banned. 
  
On the eve of the coup, the PKI was the largest communist party in the world outside of a 
communist country. It was officially committed to winning power through elections, and its 
affiliates included all of Indonesia’s trade unions and cooperatives for landless farmers. Its 
major campaign issues included land reform, as well as nationalizing foreign-owned mining, oil, 
and plantation companies. In this, they sought to mobilize Indonesia’s vast natural resources for 
the benefit of the Indonesian people, who, in the aftermath of three hundred years of colonial 
exploitation, were, on the whole, extremely poor. 
  
After the 1965 military coup, anybody opposed to the new military dictatorship could be accused 
of being a communist. This included union members, landless farmers, intellectuals, and the 
ethnic Chinese, as well as anybody who struggled for a redistribution of wealth in the aftermath 
of colonialism. In less than a year, and with the direct aid of western governments, over one 
million of these “communists” were murdered. In America, the massacre was regarded as a 
major “victory over communism,” and generally celebrated as good news. Time Magazine 
reported “the West’s best news for years in Asia,” while The New York Times ran the headline, 
“A Gleam of Light in Asia,” and praised Washington for keeping its hand in the killings well 
hidden. (The scapegoating of the ethnic Chinese, who had come to Indonesia in the 18th and 
19th centuries, was done at the incitement of the US intelligence services, which sought to drive 
a wedge between the new Indonesian regime and the People’s Republic of China. The 
slaughter of village-level members of the PKI and its affiliate unions and cooperatives was also 
encouraged by the US, who was worried that without a “scorched earth” approach, the new 
Indonesian regime might eventually accommodate the PKI base.) 
  
In many regions of Indonesia, the army recruited civilians to carry out the killings. They were 
organised into paramilitary groups, given basic training (and significant military back up). In the 
province of North Sumatra and elsewhere, the paramilitaries were recruited largely from the 
ranks of gangsters, or “preman.” Ever since the massacres, the Indonesian government has 
celebrated the “extermination of the communists” as a patriotic struggle, and celebrated the 
  
paramilitaries and gangsters as its heroes, rewarding them with power and privilege. These 
men and their protégés have occupied key positions of power—and persecuted their 
opponents—ever since. The pretext for the 1965–66 genocide was the assassination of six 
army generals on the night of October 1, 1965. 
  
On October 1, 1965, the Thirtieth of September Movement (Gerakan 30 September, or G30S), 
made up of disaffected junior Indonesian Armed Forces Officers, assassinated six Indonesian 
Army Generals in an abortive coup and dumped their bodies down a well south of the city. At 
the same time, the Movement’s troops took over the national radio station and announced that 
they intended to protect President Sukarno from a cabal of right-wing army generals plotting a 
seizure of power. The Movement was defeated before most Indonesians knew it existed. The 
senior surviving army commander, Major General Suharto, launched a quick counter-attack and 
drove the Movement’s troops from Jakarta within one day. 
  
Suharto accused the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) of masterminding the Movement and 
then orchestrated an extermination of persons affiliated with the party. Suharto’s military 
rounded up over a million and a half people, accusing all of them of being involved in the 
Movement. In one of the worst bloodbaths of the 20th century, hundreds of thousands of 
individuals were massacred by the army and its affiliated militias, largely in Central Java, East 
Java, Bali, and North Sumatra from late 1965 to mid-1966. In a climate of national emergency, 
Suharto gradually usurped President Sukarno’s authority and established himself as the de 
facto president (with the power to dismiss and appoint ministers) by March 1966.  
  
The massacres were out of all proportion to their ostensible cause. The Movement was a small-
scale conspiratorial action organised by a handful of people. In total, it killed twelve people. 
Suharto exaggerated its magnitude until it assumed the shape of an ongoing, nationwide 
conspiracy to commit mass murder. All the millions of people associated with the PKI, even 
illiterate peasants in remote villages, were presented as murderers collectively responsible for 
the Movement. 
  
Indonesian government and military officials, to the very end of the Suharto regime in 1998, 
invoked the specter of the PKI in response to any disturbance or sign of dissent. The key 
phrase in the regime’s argument was “the latent danger of communism.” The unfinished 
eradication of the PKI was, in a very real sense, the raison d’être of the Suharto regime. The 
original legal act under which the regime ruled Indonesia for over thirty years was Sukarno’s 
presidential order of 3rd October 1965, authorizing Suharto to “restore order.” That was an 
emergency order. But for Suharto, the emergency never ended. 
  
In constructing a legitimating ideology for his dictatorship, Suharto presented himself as the 
savior of the nation for having defeated the Movement. His regime incessantly drilled the event 
into the minds of the populace by every method of state propaganda: textbooks, monuments, 
street names, films, museums, commemorative rituals and national holidays. The Suharto 
regime justified its existence by placing the Movement at the center of its historical narrative 
  
and depicting the PKI as ineffably evil. Under Suharto, anti-communism became the state 
religion, complete with sacred sites, rituals, and dates. 
  
It is remarkable that the anti-PKI violence, as such a large-scale event, has been so badly 
misunderstood. No doubt, the fact that both military personnel and civilians committed the 
killings has blurred the issue of responsibility. Nonetheless, from what little is already known, it 
is clear that the military bears the largest share of responsibility and that the killings represented 
bureaucratic, planned violence more than popular, spontaneous violence. The Suharto clique of 
officers, by inventing false stories about the Movement and strictly controlling the media, 
created a sense among civilians that the PKI was on the warpath. If there had not been this 
deliberate provocation from the military, the populace would not have believed the PKI was a 
mortal threat since the party was passive in the aftermath of the Movement. (The military 
worked hard to whip up popular anger against the PKI from early October 1965 onwards, and 
the US Government actively encouraged the Indonesian military to pursue rank-and-file 
communists). It prodded civilian militias into acting, gave them assurances of impunity, and 
arranged logistical support. 
  
Contrary to common belief, frenzied violence by villagers was virtually unheard of. Suharto’s 
army usually opted for mysterious disappearances rather than exemplary public executions. 
The army and its militias tended to commit its large-scale massacres in secret: they took 
captives out of prison at night, trucked them to remote locations, executed them, and then 
buried the corpses in unmarked mass graves or threw them into rivers. 
  
The tragedy of modern Indonesian history lies not just in the army-organised mass killings of 
1965-66 but also in the rise to power of the killers, of persons who viewed massacres and 
psychological warfare operations as legitimate and normal modes of governance. A regime that 
legitimated itself by pointing to a mass grave at the site of the well, vowing “never again,” left 
countless mass graves from one end of the country to the other, from Aceh on the western 
edge to Papua on the eastern edge. The occupation of East Timor from 1975 to 1999 similarly 
left tens, if not hundreds, of thousands dead, many anonymously buried. Each mass grave in 
the archipelago marks an arbitrary, unavowed, secretive exercise of state power. 
  
The obsession with a relatively minor event (the Movement) and the erasure of a world-
historical event (the mass killings of 1965-66) has blocked empathy for the victims, such as the 
relatives of those men and women who disappeared. While a monument stands next to the well 
in which the Movement’s troops dumped the bodies of the six army generals on October 1, 
1965, there is no monument to be found at the mass graves that hold the hundreds of 
thousands of persons killed in the name of suppressing the Movement. 
  
Focus on who killed the army generals on September 30, 1965 has functioned as a fetish, 
displacing all attention from the murder of over one million alleged communists in the months 
that followed. Suharto's regime produced endless propaganda about the brutal communists 
behind the killing of the generals, and still today most discussion of the genocide has been 
displaced by this focus. And this is true even in most English-language sources. To me, 
  
participating in the debate around “who killed the generals” feels grotesque, which is why it 
does not feature in The Act of Killing. The Rwandan genocide was triggered when Rwandan 
president Juvénal Habyarimana (a Hutu) died after his airplane was shot down on its approach 
to Kigali. To focus on who shot down the plane (was it Tutsi extremists? was it Hutu extremists 
acting as provocateurs?) rather than the murder of 800,000 Tutsis and Hutu moderates over the 
next 100 days would be unconscionable. 
  
Similarly, who started the Reichstag fire is irrelevant to an understanding of the Holocaust. 
Whether or not the disgruntled army officers behind the killing of the six generals had the 
support of the head of the PKI is much more than beside the point: it plays the pernicious role of 
deflecting attention from a mass murder of world-historical importance. Imagine if, in Rwanda, 
the fundamental question about what happened in 1994 was “who shot down the president's 
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